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Gary Weatherford,* Kim Malcolm** and Barbara
Andrews***

California Groundwater
Management: The Sacred and the
Profane

ROLE OF GROUNDWATER
California tends to pump more groundwater than any other state in the
United States.' Groundwater has played a key role in California's settlement and economy.2 It has supported heavy urbanization along the southern coastal plain and extensive irrigation in the Central Valley. During
the 1976-77 drought, increased groundwater use saved the state's agricultural sector from disaster.3 Some 10,000 new wells were drilled during
that period.4 For some communities it is the primary source of water; for
others it is an important supplemental source.
As important as groundwater is to California, coordinated statewide
management of the resource is lacking. There are selective areas where
highly sophisticated management exists. In many areas, however, there
is no management whatsoever. Depending on where you look, then,
California can represent the best and worst in groundwater managementthe sacred and the profane.
In California, as elsewhere, groundwater resources tend to have some
special features. Groundwater receives some natural protection from surface sources of pollution, and undergoes low levels of water loss through
evaporation. Development of groundwater sources usually requires only
nominal, if any, land disturbance or rerouting of local streams. As importantly, groundwater basins are storage reservoirs. Much of the ground*LL.B., member of the California Bar, co-directs the water research program at the Berkeley,
CA, office of the Center for Natural Resource Studies of John Muir Institute, Inc., and is Visiting
Professor, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
**M.P.P., Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley; Assistant to
Commissioner, California Public Utilities Commission.
***J.D., member of the California and Colorado Bars, and Associate at Davis, Graham and
Stubbs, Denver, CO.
1. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GROUND WATER: AN OVERVIEW 2 (1977).
2. See generally THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS 66-69, 103-104 (W. Kahrl ed. 1978).
3. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL
REPORT 138 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S COMM'N].
4. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, POLICIES AND GOALS FOR CALIFORNIA
WATER MANAGEMENT: THE NEXT 20 YEARS 38 (1981).
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water is interconnected with surface water, of course, as part of a hydrological
continuum.
On the average, California relies on an annual developed water supply
of some 42 million acre feet (MAF), about 15 MAF of which is pumped
groundwater. 5 Groundwater generally serves roughly 25 percent of California's net water demand, and 40 percent of its applied water demand,
each year.6 Interestingly, California accounts for a large share of the
groundwater withdrawn in the United States, e.g., 23 percent in 1975. 7
Misuse of groundwater has led to a number of problems in the state.
First, the resource could become seriously depleted in many areas. An
estimated 2.5 MAF per year of groundwater is being withdrawn over
replacement amounts, a decline over the 4.9 MAF estimated for 1955.8
Eleven groundwater basins are experiencing critical overdrafting; another
31 show conditions or impacts of overdrafting. 9 The overdraft not only
threatens resource availability in the long run, it requires more expensive
pumping and drilling processes in the short run. Second, in coastal areas
lowered groundwater tables lead to sea water intrusion. Third, discoveries
of groundwater contamination continue to unfold. Rising concentrations
of nitrates are being found statewide, for example. Toxic compounds,
such as TCE and DBCP, have caused thousands of well closings in several
areas of the state.'° Fourth, land subsidence, resulting from drastically
lowered groundwater tables, has become a major problem in some regions
of the state, notably the San Joaquin and Santa Clara Valleys."
OCCURRENCE OF GROUNDWATER
Groundwater basins underlie roughly 40 percent of California's 100
million acres, representing an estimated total storage capacity of 1.3
billion acre feet and a usable storage capacity in excess of 140 million
acre feet.12 About 400 groundwater basins have been identified in the
state. 3 Many of the basins are connected with surface water flows which
are principal sources of recharge.
5. R. Coppock & W. Wood, Jr., Background paper for University of California conference,
Competition for California's Water: Alternative Resolutions, at Pacific Grove, Cal. (Sept. 30-Oct.
2, 1981).
6. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 3, at 136.
7. U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, I THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES 19752000, at 20 (1978).
8. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 4, at 38.
9. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA
13 (1980).
10. CAL. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY/WATER
RIGHTS 1978-80 REPORT 10, 18, 20 (1981).
11. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 3, at 141.
12. CAL. DEP'T WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA GROUND WATER 3 (1975).
13. DEP'T WATER RESOURCES, supra note 9, at 1-5.
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Most of California's groundwater occurs in the younger alluvial fill of
more than 250 valleys.' 4 The San Joaquin Valley, which makes up the
southern end of the great Central Valley, alone is estimated to have a
usable groundwater storage capacity of 80 million acre feet.15 Groundwater also occurs, however, and is used,
in fractured rock, volcanic and
6
glacial moraine areas within the state.'
In its natural state the groundwater varies in organic and mineral content. Generally, it is of a good enough quality to support all beneficial
uses, even in the developed basins.' 7
Although considerable investigation has occurred, much remains to be
known about the occurrence, quantity, quality and surface water interconnectedness of California groundwater.
LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS RELATING TO GROUNDWATER
There is no coherent or comprehensive groundwater law, polity or
policy in California. Rather there are scattered strands of precedent and
experience awaiting judicial and political splicing and braiding. The major
regulator of groundwater in the state is the dollar-the economic cost of
pumping and deepening wells.
The complexity of groundwater law and policy in California starts with
contrasting institutional treatment of surface and groundwater, contrary
to the hydrologic reality. California has a hybrid water law system for
surface water, composed of prior appropriation rights (an earlier appropriator prevails over later appropriator), riparian rights (based on ownership of streamside land) and administrative permit rights (granted and
regulated by a state agency since 1914). The regulation of water quality
and surface water rights has been integrated in a single state agency, the
State Water Resources Control Board.
Groundwater use, in contrast, is not regulated by a statewide permit
system. Groundwater rights are defined by court-made law. The regulation
of groundwater use occurs only selectively, and often indirectly, where
water districts have groundwater management programs. Broadly speaking, then, there are two, sometimes interrelated, groundwater institutions:
court adjudications and legislatively created water management districts.
The California law of groundwater rights involves correlative rights,
appropriative rights, mutual prescription, and notions of equitable apportionment. " In 1903 the California Supreme Court (Katz v. Walkin14. DEP'T WATER RESOURCES, supra note 12, at 11.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 19-20.
18. See generally SCHNEIDER, GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS LAW, STAFF PAPER NO. 2, GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1977),
upon which much of this discussion is based [hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER].
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shaw) 9 rejected the absolute ownership rule of English common law,
choosing instead the concept of correlative rights. This, akin to the riparian law of surface waters, limited overlying owners to reasonable use,
that is, a "fair and just proportion," taking into account the interests of
neighbors.20 Under the holding the rights of overlying landowners have
priority over the rights of non-overlying appropriators (which are limited
to surplus water). As between non-overlying appropriators, first in time
was held to be first in right.
The Court's decision was reinforced by a 1928 Constitutional Amendment (Article 10, Section 2) requiring the reasonable, beneficial use of
water throughout the state. In some subsequent cases, the practical result
of the emphasis on reasonable use has been the encouragement by courts
of "physical solutions," ' 2' sometimes reached through stipulated judgments, which can be based upon alternative water supplies, exchanges,
conservation, reuse and other means of reducing conflict.
The relative rights among and between overlying and nonoverlying
pumpers were significantly redefined by a 1949 decision of the California
Supreme Court (City of Pasadenav. City ofAlhambra),22 which held that
groundwater withdrawals could be judicially limited to safe yield by
proportionately reducing the pumping of all parties, using five-year periods of highest continuous use following the beginning of overdraft as
the measure for the amount of water to which the reduction would apply.
-This "mutual prescription" approach was based on the law of prescription
(which permits adverse users to obtain property rights through hostile
and continuous possession for a period defined by the statute limiting the
time for commencement of a relevant legal action). In effect, after the
groundwater basins reached an overdraft condition, private pumpers would
acquire rights against one another by the continued act of pumping,
without regard to seniority or the location of use.
The mutual prescription doctrine posed weighty problems and questions. Rights of prescription cannot be acquired against public entities,
such as cities and water districts, which pump large quantities of water
in some areas. Yet these public entities can acquire prescriptive rights
against private parties. To stop the ripening of a prescriptive right, a party
may have to assume high information and litigation costs in asking a
court to declare his rights or enjoin an adverse party. 23 Most important,
19. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
20. Id. at 135, 74 P. at 772.
21. SCHNEIDER, supra note 18, at 17.
22. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
23. See Note, A Postscript to the Mutual PrescriptionDoctrine-City of Los Angeles v. City of
San Fernando, II LAND & WATER L. REV. 131, 139-40 (1976).
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the doctrine invites waste and accelerated development-a "race to the
pump house." ' 24 Unfortunately, the Court's 1949 decision "encouraged
defensive ground water overdrafting by pumpers in other basins who
anticipated ground water adjudication." 25
26
In a 1975 decision (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando),
the California Supreme Court severely limited the mutual prescription
doctrine. It required "notice of adversity in fact caused by the actual
commencement of overdraft."27 It exempted public entities from prescription. It modernized the definition of overdraft to be the condition
when withdrawals exceed both safe yield and temporary surplus (water
extracted to create aquifer storage space for surface water otherwise lost
in wet years). It reiterated the legitimacy of groundwater storage rights.28
Finally, it declared that equitable apportionment is more important than
the strict precepts of mutual prescription, or as one commentator has
stated it "that all water fights must be subject to reasonable conditions
and priorities."29
At present California groundwater law is a confusing array of correlative rights, appropriative rights, prescriptive rights, and equitable rightsall subject to adjustment through judicial discretion. In addition to these
rights, it is the continuing jurisdiction of courts, actions of court-appointed
watermasters, practices of local management districts, and economics of
pumping that govern the conduct of users in adjudicated basins.
Management districts may be formed in California with or without
adjudication. Of the non-adjudicated districts, the Orange County Water
District in Southern California is often referred to as a leader in groundwater management. The District was formed by legislation in 1933 to
combat problems of overdraft and sea water intrusion. It has broad management powers, including those concerning water storage, importation,
appropriation and distribution of water resources. The District also has
extensive financing powers and may levy three types of assessments: 1)
ad valorem property taxes; 2) "pump taxes" or "replenishment assessments"; and 3) basin equity taxes. The latter tax is used to equalize the
costs of surface water and groundwater so that water users will voluntarily
adjust the amounts of each they use, depending on the relative availability
of surface water and the level of the water table. The "pump tax" is
24. Krieger & Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 62 (1962).
25. Gleason, Los Angeles v. San Fernando: Ground Water Management in the Grand Tradition,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 703, 709 (1977).
26. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
27. Id. at 283, 537 P.2d at 1311, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
28. See Gleason, supra note 25, at 711-12; see also Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground,
5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 625, 639-49 (1976).
29. See GLEASON, supra note 25, at 713.
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applied only when the basin is overdrafted, and has withstood litigation
reviewing its constitutionality.3"
District management programs may also be initiated by adjudication,
which occurs when individuals, cities or local water entities go to court
in an effort to redress overdraft and sea water intrusion problems. In its
judgment a court can name an individual or group to act as a watermaster,
with the power to levy assessments, purchase supplemental water, and
control storage, subject to court review and oversight.3
The two state water agencies, the Department of Water Resources
(DWR) and the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), do have
some limited jurisdiction over groundwater matters. The Department acts
as court-appointed watermaster in Los Angeles, Ventura, San Bernardino
and Riverside Counties, administering permits for extractions in excess
of twenty-five acre-feet per year. The Department also has statewide
informational filing requirements for well-drilling, and guidelines for
county ordinances regarding well construction and abandonment. Ninety
counties and one hundred thirty-two cities have adopted state standards
for well construction and abandonment since the standards were drawn
up in 1968.32 The Department is trying to develop conjunctive use programs for the State Water Project which delivers water to the San Joaquin
Valley and Southern California.33 It has delineated the groundwater basins
of the state, identified critical areas, 34 and undertaken a groundwater
modeling study of the San Joaquin Valley area where most of the state's
overdrafting occurs. The State Water Resources Control Board requires
four Southern California counties to report amounts of groundwater pumped
yearly. The Board has the power to protect groundwater resources by
initiating adjudication, although it has not used this power.35 It and the
regional water quality boards are authorized to control groundwater polare mandated to prevent the waste
lution, and both it and the Department
36
and unreasonable use of water.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Statewide interest in groundwater problems has peaked periodically
during this century. The groundwater overdraft was a major reason given
for the construction of the federal Central Valley Project and the State
30. SCHNEIDER, supra note 18, at 43-49.
31. Id. at 53-58.
32. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER WELL STANDARDS: STATE OF CALIFORNIA iii (1981).
33. See Robie & Donovan, Water Management of the Future: A Ground Water Storage Program
for the California State Water Project, 11 PAC. L.J. 41 (1979).
34. See DEP'T WATER RESOURCES, supra note 9.
35. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 3, at 145.
36. CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1982).
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Water Project. A new level of statewide interest in groundwater has been
evident since about 1975 when an agency study surveyed available information and recommended conjunctive management." The water years
of 1975-77 rivaled the driest on record in California,38 spurring the
expanded use and new development of groundwater. Groundwater cushioned the drought for agriculture in the face of reductions in the delivery
of surface water.39
The drought prompted Governor Edmond G. Brown, Jr. to appoint,
in May of 1977, a blue ribbon Commission to Review California Water
Rights Law. Groundwater rights was one of six study areas covered by
the Commission and its staff.' °
In its final report (December 1978) the Commission:
" Noted problems of over-pumping, water quality, sea water intrusion
and land subsidence;
" Warned of a "tragedy of the commons" future for the common
pool groundwater resources of the state if no action were taken;
* Cited the absence of state-level comprehensive groundwater management programs;
" Asserted that imported surface water could not alone solve the
problem of overdraft;
" Recognized that legal uncertainties were frustrating the management of groundwater and the marketing of groundwater rights and;
" Recommended passage of legislation
-authorizing the designation of groundwater management areas
in which local groundwater management authorities would implement reasonable remedial measures;
-simplifying the adjudication of groundwater rights;
-allocating rights in areas with long-term overdraft mainly on
the basis of recent use; and
-allocating rights in other areas on a priority basis, moving from
pueblo uses to the recapture of stored water, to correlative overlying uses to appropriative uses (applying the first-in-time, firstin-right rule), subject to prescription if any."'
37.
38.
DATE
39.

DEP'T WATER RESOURCES, supra note 12.
CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, THE CALIFORNIA DROUGHT 1977, AN UP1 (1977).
Id. at 17-18. According to GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 3, at 138:
In the 1976-77 drought, water users progressively increased their use of groundwater supplies
as surface water supplies diminished. Groundwater depletion in the San Joaquin and TWlare
hydrologic study areas increased to almost 5 million acre-feet, which is nearly four times the
normal overdraft in those areas. An estimated 28,000 wells were drilled, deepened, or repaired.
Overdraft electricity pumping costs for 1977 increased substantially and there were increases
on the order of 35 percent in agricultural electrical power usage over 1975 levels. Although
the huge 1977 groundwater overdraft was very expensive, it saved agriculture from disaster.
40. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 18.
41. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N, supra note 3, at 135-254.
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Those proposals and others offered by the Commission were incorporated in bills (AB 442 and SB 47) of the 1979-80 legislature which
failed to pass. A subsequently-released study by the RAND Corporation
also urged improved management and planning, and a market system for
transferring rights.42
Agricultural interests (particularly San Joaquin Valley growers who are
responsible for approximately 1.5 million acre-feet of overdraft per year)
have opposed these groundwater management proposals, contending that
groundwater management, including conjunctive management, is and has
been effectively implemented by local water agencies. To quote San
Joaquin Valley interests:
The existence of overdraft in the southern San Joaquin Valley does
not indicate an "unmanaged" situation, but only the absence of an
adequate supply of supplemental water to integrate into the conjunctive use operations.43
The issues of water conservation, instream values and groundwater
management currently have been entwined with the controversy over
construction of a forty-three mile Peripheral Canal in the SacramentoSan Joaquin Delta, designed to facilitate increased water deliveries to the
San Joaquin Valley and Southern California. Legislation authorizing the
canal and other facilities was rejected by the people in a referendum vote
in June, 1982. Northern California interests opposed to the Peripheral
Canal sought to impose greater water conservation and groundwater management on water users in lieu of, or as a condition of, Peripheral Canal
construction. The November 1982 ballot contains an initiative (Proposition 13) entitled, "Water Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act,"
which, among other things, would require state-designated local groundwater management authorities for eleven critical overdraft areas. 44
Passage of special legislation in 1980 (SB 1391) to meet two critical
areas of overdraft is noteworthy. The Sierra Valley and Long Valley
Groundwater Basin Act authorized multiple counties to create groundwater management districts by joint powers agreements; to require the
registration of groundwater extraction; to purchase, condemn, import,
store, reclaim and/or exchange water; to enjoin well interference; to require permits before groundwater can be exported; and to levy extraction
42. D. JAQUETTE & N. MOORE, EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: GROUNDWATER USE AND MANAGEMENT (1978).
43. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY AGRICULTURAL COMM., WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA 6 (1979).
44. Section 15320 of the initiative measure identifies the following as critical overdraft areas:
Santa Cruz-Pajaro Basin, Cuyama Valley Basin, Ventura County Basin, Eastern San Joaquin County
Basin, Chowchilla Basin, Madera Basin, Kings Basin, Kaweah Basin, Tulare Lake Basin, Tule
Basin and Kern County Basin.
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and management charges. Cooperation with county and state entities in
Nevada was authorized with respect to the Long Valley Basin which is
intersected by the state line. The three affected California counties have
undertaken technical investigations and management planning under the
Act, in preparation for the groundwater management districts.
Another development of interest is the reported drafting of groundwater
management legislation to meet overdraft problems in the Fresno area of
the San Joaquin Valley. Apparently a multiple-county management entity
is envisioned.45
PROSPECTS
In California, groundwater management cannot be divorced at present
from a number of other difficult issues and problems, including new
surface water development, Delta water quality, water conservation, northsouth sectionalism, wild and scenic river status of north coast rivers,
drought planning, salinity management, high energy costs, governmental
fiscal crises, and regulatory conservatism. The prospects for improved
groundwater management are dependent, in large part, upon developments in those related areas of controversy and concern.
Consider, for example, the roles which imported water and pumping
costs each play. The availability of comparatively less expensive surface
water can determine the amount both of artificial recharge and of pumping
in an area. And the amount of recharge and pumping determines the status
of the water table and scale of conflict between users, which in turn
influences whether adjudication and/or more sophisticated management
programs are pursued.
Often, groundwater management in California has been linked to imported water supplies. A common pattern has been to develop local surface
water supplies, then pump groundwater into a condition of overdraft
(possibly creating salt water intrusion and/or subsidence), and then import
surface or groundwater supplies which can relieve part of the demand
for groundwater and recharge the local groundwater basin (directly or
indirectly after irrigation). The noted water law authority, Frank Trelease,
has characterized the "California solution" as follows: "if you have a
water problem, pour water on it and it will go away. "4 Much of what
goes on under the name of groundwater management in California is
simply the recharging of aquifers when surface water or imported water
is plentiful and cheap, without more; that is, limited conjunctive management without regulation of use. In such instances, the relative avail45. Personal communication with Richard Lehman, Office of State Assemblyman, Fresno (Nov.
17, 1981).
46. Trelease, Legal Solutions to Groundwater Problems-A General Overview, 11 PAC. L.J.
863, 865 (1980).
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ability of surface supplies (local or imported) and the comparative costs
of drilling and pumping regulate groundwater use.
The cost of pumping deserves special mention because it has become
and promises to remain the most important factor influencing the agricultural use of groundwater in California. Energy costs are rising exponentially. As noted in late 1981,
the electrical energy charge per kilowatt hour from 1950 to 1971
was approximately one cent; today the same kilowatt hour is costing
from 6.2 to 7.3 cents and should the Base Rate and Energy Cost
Adjustment Clause Charge increases prevail as projected, a kilowatt
hour will cost about 16 cents in 1990 and 33 cents in year 2000,
five times today's rate. 47
In areas of deep and declining water tables the pumping costs have become
prohibitive for some crops and will become so for many more. In one
area of the southern San Joaquin Valley, with an average depth to static
groundwater of 454 feet, the total pumping cost (including operation,
maintenance and replacement) in 1980 was estimated to be about $74
per acre-foot of water; in 1983, at an average depth to static groundwater
of 455 feet, the projection is about $102; and, in the year 2000, at 465
feet, the estimate rises to $350.48 The front-end capital costs are high in
California also (e.g., an estimated $75,000 for a 900-foot well with a
150-horsepower motor and pump), as are service or stand-by charges
(e.g.,$600 for 50-horsepower motor in 1981).41
Several possible scenarios can be charted for groundwater management
in California: continuance of the status quo, significantly increased management resulting from litigation or local initiatives, or state-imposed
management.
Under the status quo scenario, the areas with reasonably sophisticated
basin management (e.g., Orange, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside and Santa Clara Counties) would continue to refine their practices
and programs, and the San Joaquin Valley would continue overdrafting,
selectively recharging basins when supplementary surface water was
available.
Under the local initiative and litigation scenario, conflict between local
entities in overdrafted basins would prompt either the adjudication of
rights, with the likelihood of the court-decreed administration of water
rights by watermasters, or the formation of management entities through
joint powers agreements or enabling legislation authorizing special districts.
47. R. Schafer, San Joaquin Valley Groundwater Pumping Costs 4, paper for conference of
Association of California Water Agencies, Monterey, Cal. (Nov. 1981).
48. Id. at 14, Table F.
49. Id. at at 3, 8.
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Under a state intervention scenario, groundwater management would
be required for areas where critical overdraft conditions existed or were
imminent. Local governments and districts, singularly or jointly, would
probably be designated as the management entities, with a state agency
having a degree of oversight or backup authority. This could be accompanied by state-promulgated standards concerning safe yield, conjunctive
use, conservation, groundwater storage, pollution control and water right
transfers. One could expect the grandfathering of senior uses, exemptions
for cases of economic hardship, graduated implementation of regulations
and limitations on the expansion of irrigated acreage to be issues or
elements of such a state-imposed program.
As it currently stands populous Southern California, with its adjudicated
basins and localized groundwater management programs, has no incentive
to seek stronger state involvement. State intervention is vigorously opposed in the San Joaquin Valley. Generally speaking, it is Northern California interests, which view improved groundwater management, water
conservation and growth control as preferred alternatives to the development and exportation of Northern California water, that seek state
mandated groundwater management. The Proposition 13 vote in November of 1982, noted above, will test the opinion of the electorate with
respect to ongoing water resource development, water conservation and
groundwater management in the state.
California and Mexico share common groundwater basins in the Colorado River and Tijuana River drainages, where pumping is occurring
on both sides of the border, suggesting the future need for some form of
coordinated management. The most promising approach on the California
side would be the legislative establishment of groundwater management
districts, without adjudication, along the lines of the Sierra Valley and
Long Valley models, discussed above. Such districts could cooperate,
through the offices of the state water agencies and the International Boundary and Waters Commission,with federal authorities in Mexico to achieve
parallel controls.
Not to approximate sustained yield is implicitly to regard the groundwater resource of California as a stock which it is better to deplete today
than to sustain for tomorrow. Difficult value choices are involved, but
rarely posed clearly for the public. Rather the choices are made incrementally by individual decisions regarding drilling and pumping. Then,
when the aggregate effect of those incremental choices becomes dramatic
with overdrafting, subsidence or salt intrusion, the public is asked to
subsidize in some form the development or importation of water, partially
under the guise of conjunctive management. It is a hard pattern to break.
Whether we in California will continue to pass part of the resulting costs
of that habit pattern on to future generations is one of many unresolved
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issues of the day. Pending a resolution, we-respectfully-remain part
sacred, part profane.

ADMINISTRACION DE LAS AGUAS SUBTERRANEAS DE CALIFORNIA:
LO SAGRADO Y LO PROFANO

California extrae grandes cantidades de aguas subterrAneas sin contar con un programa
de administraci6n de amplitud estatal. En algunas reas existen distritos especiales
que tienen una administraci6n conjunta muy sofisticada, mientras que, al parecer, en
otras reas no hay ninguna administraci6n. Se aplica una mezcla confusa de doctrinas
legales a las aguas subterrdneas en el Estado, incluyendo derechos correlativos, derechos de apropiaci6n, de prescripci6n mutua y nociones de distribuci6n equitativa.
La economfa de laperforaci6n y elbombeo, significada por un alza exponencial del
costo de laenergia, regula el uso del agua subterrdnea mds que las leyes. En un
futuro, la sobreexplotaci6n o los problemas de-contaminaci6n en la frontera con
Mdxico pueden ser superados por la creaci6n de distritos situados en el lado de
California, especializados en laadministraci6n de aguas subterrAneas.
Papel del agua subterrdnea
California bombea una buena parte (23%) del agua subterrdnea que se extrae en los Estados
Unidos. 15 millones de acres-pies de agua de 42 millones de acres-pies de agua de California del
abastecimiento de agua anual es agua subterrAnea bombeada. El agua subterrdnea ha sostenido los
asentamientos en una forma considerable y rescatado tierras Adidas para laagricultura en el estado,
pero no existe una administraci6n coordinada del recurso para todo el estado. En algunas Areas,
encontramos una administraci6n conjunta muy sofisticada, hecha por distritos especiales, mientras
que existen reas que no tienen ninguna administraci6n.
Los problemas incluyen sobreexplotaci6n (se estiman 2.5 millones de acres-pies por afio);
intrusiones de agua salada, contaminaci6n de las aguas subterrAneas y hundimientos del suelo.
Disponibilidad de aguas subterrdnea
California tiene cerca de 400 cuencas de agua subterrAnea con una capacidad de reserva utilizable
mayor a 140 millones de acres-pies, pero atn falta saber acerca de ladisponibilidad, cantidad,
cualidad y relaci6n del agua de lasuperficie con las aguas subterrdneas del estado.
Leyes y instituciones relacionadas con el agua subterrdnea
El derecho de las aguas subterrfAneas de California es una mezcla compleja de precedentes y
de experiencias. El agua de la superficie esta regulada en su mayoria por un sistema que abarca a
todo el Estado. La jurisprudencia define los derechos sobre las aguas subterrAneas. La legislaci6n
del uso del agua subterrAnea se da selectivamente s6lo donde los distritos de agua tienen programas
de administraci6n del agua del subsuelo. Dos instituciones que a veces se relacionan, ademis de la
economia de laperforaci6n y el bombeo, influencian mucho en el uso del agua subterrAnea en drea
de administraci6n activa: las sentencias de los tribunales y distritos de administraci6n creados
legislativamente.
La doctrina de "absoluta pertenencia"' fud judicialmente reemplazada por ladoctrina de "derechos
correlativos" en 1903, que a su vez fud desechada por una modificaci6n en laconstituci6n de 1928,
en lacual se establecia un uso razonable del agua. La doctrina de "prescripci6n mutua," que estA
a favor de un bombeo excesivo a travs de una "posesi6n adversa" fud adoptada por laSuprema
Corte de California en 1949, y mAs tarde file limitada por una decisi6n de 1975, de lamisma Corte,
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Ciudad de Los Angeles vs. Ciudad de San Fernando, que concedia una distribuci6n legal y equitativa
en los derechos de almacenamiento de agua subteffinea.
Los distritos de administraci6n del agua subterrfnea pueden ser reforzados para establecer y aplicar
impuestos a la propiedad, al bombeo y impuestos sobre el uso proporcional de la cuenca. Es comton
que los tribunales designen especialistas para vigilar la continuidad de la aplicaci6n de sus resoluciones
y sentencias.
Desarrollos recientes
El perfodo de sequfa de 1975 a 1977 provoc6 un estudio de la Comisi6n de Gobernadores para
Revisar los Derechos de Agua de California, el cual pidi6 una nueva legislaci6n para que fuera
authorizada Ia administraci6n del agua subterrdnea en Areas especfficas y poniendo en claro los
derechos sobre las aguas. Tal legislaci6n no ha sido promulgada pero una iniciativa apuntada para
tomar previsiones similares en el referendo de noviembre de 1982, estA en camino al momento de
escribir dsto.
Perspectivas
La administraci6n de agua subterrdnea en California estA entrelazada con otros aspectos de la
administraci6n de aguas que no se ha resuelto, asi corno con los incrementos del costo de bombeo.
Se puede anticipar que existen diversos escenarios donde puede hacerse posible la administraci6n
de las aguas subterrfneas en California: la continuaci6n de un status quo; manejo significativamente
incrementado, como resultante de litigios; de iniciativas locales o de administraci6n impuesta por
el Estado. En el futuro, la sobreexplotaci6n o los problemas de contaminaci6n a Io largo de la
frontera con Mdxico, podrfan ser superados con la creaci6n de distritos para la administraci6n de
aguas subterrdneas en el lado de California. El Piblico debe esperar dificiles juicios de valor.
California permanece en parte sagrada y en parte profana en la administraci6n del agua del subsuelo.

